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Abstract
Fair division theory mostly involves individual consumption. But
resources are often allocated to groups, such as families or countries,
whose members consume the same bundle but have different prefer-
ences. Do fair and efficient allocations exist in such an ”economy of
families”?
We adapt three common notions of fairness: fair-share, no-envy
and egalitarian-equivalence, to an economy of families. The stronger
adaptation — individual fairness — requires that each individual in
each family perceives the division as fair; the weaker one — family
fairness — requires that the family as a whole, treated as a single
agent with (typically) incomplete preferences, perceives the division
as fair. Individual-fair-share, family-no-envy and family-egalitarian-
equivalence are compatible with efficiency under broad conditions.
The same holds for individual-no-envy when there are only two fam-
ilies. In contrast, individual-no-envy with three or more families and
individual-egalitarian-equivalence with two or more families are typi-
cally incompatible with efficiency, unlike the situation in an economy
of individuals. The common market equilibrium approach to fairness
is of limited use in economies with families. In contrast, the leximin
approach is broadly applicable: it yields an efficient, individual-fair-
share, and family-egalitarian-equivalent allocation.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
06
68
4v
2 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  2
2 N
ov
 20
18
1 Introduction
Several siblings inherit their parents’ goods. Can they divide the goods
among them in a fair and efficient way? This problem has been extensively
studied in economics. A classic positive result by Varian (1974) shows that,
under mild conditions, there exists a Pareto-efficient division that is also fair
in the sense that no sibling envies another one. But now assume that each
sibling is married and has children, so that the goods have to be divided
among families. Once the goods are divided, all family-members consume
the same bundle: they live in the same house, use the same furniture, and
enjoy the same trees and flowers in the backyard. Family members may have
different preferences: while the husband in one family may prefer his family’s
bundle to bundles obtained by his siblings’ families (and thus feel no envy),
his wife may prefer the bundle obtained by his sister’s family.
As another example, consider the division of disputed lands among sev-
eral countries. Different citizens of the same country may have different
preferences over shares. This might lead to difficulties in negotiating dispute-
settlement agreements, as each citizen might have different ideas on which
parts of the disputed resources are more important, and thus different ideas
on the fairness of each agreement to settle the dispute.
These examples provoke two questions: (a) What divisions should be
considered “fair” in an economy of families? (b) In what economies do fair
and efficient allocations exist?
We investigate these questions considering three classic fairness criteria.
An allocation has the fair-share guarantee (FS)1 if no agent likes the average
bundle better than their own bundle; if each agent likes their bundle at
least as much as any other agent’s bundle then the allocation satisfies no
envy (NE) 2; the allocation is egalitarian-equivalent (EE) if there exists a
reference bundle that each agent believes to be equivalent to their share.
Considering either the families or the individuals in our economy as the
agents, we present two different adaptations of these three notions of fairness.
A division is individual-fair if all family members unanimously agree that it
1Also known as proportionality.
2Also known as envy-freeness.
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satisfies the selected fairness notion (NE or FS or EE). A division is family-
fair if it satisfies the selected fairness notion according the the family’s —
typically incomplete — preferences, which rank one bundle above another
bundle if the first bundle is preferred to the second by all its members. The
notions of individual fairness are stronger than the notions of family-fairness:
to be considered individual-fair, all family members have to unanimously
agree on the comparison between their family’s share and the other families
bundles or respectively the reference bundle.
The assumption that family members consume the same bundle has two
opposing effects: For one allocation to Pareto dominate another all members
of all families must prefer their family’s bundle under the first allocation. So
the criterion of Pareto domination becomes harder to satisfy and there should
be a larger set of Pareto optima. Conversely, the existence of families makes
individual fairness harder to satisfy, since all members of each family should
agree that their share is fair. Since the existence of families affects efficiency
and individual fairness in opposite directions, it is a-priori not clear when
Pareto optimal and individual-fair allocations exist. It is however expected
that the conditions which suffice for the existence of fair Pareto optima in
the standard model suffice for the existence of family-fair Pareto optima.
Our main results are:
• Individual-FS Pareto optima exist for any number of families, under
mild compactness assumptions (Theorem 4.1). In particular, leximin-
optimal allocations exist, they are efficient, and with the right selection
of utility functions they are also individual-FS.
• Individual-NE Pareto optima exist for two families whose members
have convex preferences (Theorem 5.1), but might not exist for three
or more families even with strictly monotonic convex preferences (The-
orem 5.2).
• Family-NE Pareto optima, that are also individual-FS, exist for any
number of families whose members have locally-non-satiated strictly
convex preferences (Theorem 5.5).
• Individual-EE Pareto optima might not exist even for two families
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whose members have strictly monotonic convex preferences (Theorem
6.1).
• Family-EE Pareto optima, that are also individual-FS, exist for any
number of families whose members have strictly monotonic strictly con-
vex preferences (Theorem 6.2). Without strict convexity, it is possible
to guarantee any two of the three conditions (family-EE, individual-FS
and Pareto-optimality) but not all three (Theorem 6.5).
In addition, we investigate the relation between fairness and market equilib-
rium. In a standard economy, whenever there exists a market equilibrium
from equal endowments, it is both Pareto-optimal and has no envy (Varian,
1974). We show that this relation does not hold in an economy of families.
Firstly, we show in Proposition 5.3 that even if individual-NE Pareto
optima exist, it may be impossible to find them as market equilibria from
equal endowments. To attain individual-NE, families with divergent prefer-
ences may need more income than families with homogeneous preferences.
Say three families care about only two goods: donations to charity and the
acquisition of modern art. For a family which cares about both not to envy
two other families who respectively only care about charity or art, the fam-
ily with members of either sort needs to spend at least as much on art and
charity as do the families who only spend on only one of the two. Similarly,
while we show in Theorem 5.5 that economies with strictly convex and locally
non-satiated preferences always have family-NE and individually-FS Pareto
optima, we show in Proposition 5.4 that market equilibria from equal en-
dowments need not have the two fairness properties. So money and markets
do not guarantee fair outcomes in economies with families. Safeguards for
families with discordant preferences or for individuals within families may be
required to obtain fair allocations.
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2 Related work
2.1 Fairness criteria
The modern study of fairness in economics was initiated by Steinhaus (1948).
He proved the existence of fair share allocations of a heterogeneous good
(“cake”). Since then, fairness has been extensively studied in economics
(Young, 1995; Moulin, 2004; Thomson, 2011) as well as in other disciplines
such as mathematics and computer science.
The existence of Pareto-optimal no-envy allocations was initially proved
as a consequence of the existence of market equilibrium. If all preferences are
convex and strictly monotonic, then there exists a market equilibrium from
equal incomes, and it is both Pareto-optimal and envy-free. Varian (1974)
showed that the convexity of preferences can be replaced by a different con-
dition: for each weakly-Pareto-optimal utility profile, the set of allocations
with this utility profile is a singleton. Svensson (1983) showed that it is suffi-
cient that this set of allocations be convex. Diamantaras (1992) showed that
it is sufficient that this set of allocations be contractible. He showed that
this is true even for economies with public goods. Svensson (1994) proved
existence under a different condition which he termed “sigma-optimality”.
In contrast to all these general existence results, we show that individual-NE
Pareto optima rarely exist in economies with families — even when all agents
have well-behaved preferences and there are very few families.
The egalitarian equivalence criterion was introduced by Pazner and Schmei-
dler (1978). They proved that a Pareto-optimal egalitarian-equivalent alloca-
tion exists even in economies with production, in contrast to Pareto-optimal
no-envy allocation (Vohra, 1992). In contrast, we show non-existence in
economies with families, even when there are two families and no produc-
tion.
2.2 Incomplete preferences
Formally the families in this paper are agents with incomplete preferences
that can be represented by vector valued utilities. Viewed that way our paper
contributes to the literature on behavioral welfare economics pioneered by
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Fon and Otani (1979); Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 2009); Mandler (2014,
2017); Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2013). Consider an economy where all
agents view all options through a set of different frames, as suggested by
Salant and Rubinstein (2008). The notions of individual and family fairness
then respectively require that an allocation is fair according to each frame of
an agent or according to the incomplete preferences of the agent. If the agent
uses different frames in different points of time or to evaluate uncertainty
we can apply our results to economies where agents have β − δ-preferences
following Laibson (1997); ODonoghue and Rabin (1999) or exhibit Knightian
uncertainty following Bewley (2002).
2.3 Public and club goods
The existence of fair allocations when some of the goods are public has been
studied e.g. by Diamantaras (1992); Diamantaras and Wilkie (1994, 1996);
Guth and Kliemt (2002). There, each good is either private (consumed by a
single agent) or public (consumed by all agents).
We conversely consider club goods, that is goods that are public inside a
family — but private outside (i.e, all family members enjoy the same bundle,
but members of other families cannot enjoy it). Club goods were popularized
by Buchanan (1965) and studied in various contexts. The literature on club
goods studies questions such as optimal number of members in a club, optimal
quantity of club-good provision, pricing policies and exclusion mechanisms
(Sandler and Tschirhart, 1980; Hillman, 1993; Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997;
Loertscher and Marx, 2017; Mackenzie and Trudeau, 2017). As far as we
know, fair allocation of goods among different clubs has not been considered
yet. 3
2.4 Families and groups
Manurangsi and Suksompong (2017); Suksompong (2018); Segal-Halevi and
Suksompong (2018); Segal-Halevi and Nitzan (2015) study the algorithmic
3In contrast to the literature on club goods, in this paper we do not consider congestion
effects: the family sizes are fixed, and all members of a family consume the same bundle
regardless of the family size.
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problem of fairly dividing a single heterogeneous resource (“cake”) or sev-
eral indivisible goods among families. The requirements in these problems
are quite different than ours: in cake-cutting the main requirement (besides
fairness) is connectivity, and with indivisible goods fairness typically can-
not be guaranteed, so the focus is on finding appropriate approximations to
fairness. They show that, in most settings, individual-fairness (which they
call “unanimous-fairness”) is not guaranteed to exist. Therefore, they relax
the fairness notion by requiring that only a certain fraction of the mem-
bers in each family perceive the division as fair (they call this relaxation
“democratic-fairness”).
It is important to distinguish our family-based fairness notions from two
different notions of group fairness.
(a) One notion of group-fairness involves the standard resource-allocation
setting in which each individual receives an individual bundle (Berliant et al.,
1992; Hu¨sseinov, 2011; Dall’Aglio et al., 2009; Dall’Aglio and Di Luca, 2014;
Todo et al., 2011; Mouri et al., 2012). A group-envy-free division is defined
as a division in which no coalition of individuals can take the pieces allocated
to another coalition with the same number of individuals and re-divide the
pieces among its members such that all members are weakly better-off. In
our setting the families are fixed and agents do not form coalitions on-the-fly;
the challenge arises from the fact that all individuals in each family consume
the same bundle.
(b) A second notion of group-fairness comes from an entirely different
field — artificial intelligence. Consider an AI system that automatically
detects potential criminals based on their personal traits. If such a system
reports significantly more suspects with a certain skin-color, this might be
considered a violation of group-fairness — the members of the group with
that particular skin-color are treated unfairly. There is a growing literature
on various definitions of group-fairness in this context; see, for example,
Dwork et al. (2012), He´bert-Johnson et al. (2017) and the references therein.
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3 Preliminaries
3.1 Economies
Let I and F denote the set of individuals and families. Each individual i ∈ I
belongs to exactly one family f ∈ F , where φi is the family f with i ∈ f . A
family f may contain one or more individuals.
There are G different homogeneous divisible goods and RG+ is the set
of consumption bundles (the non-negative orthant of the G-dimensional Eu-
clidean space). There is a total endowment e ∈ RG+ with e 0.4 The average
bundle available to each family, also called the fair share, is e := 1|F |e. An
allocation is a vector {xf}f∈F of consumption bundles xf ∈ RG+ whose sum
does not exceed the aggregate endowment:
∑
f∈F xf ≤ e. The set of all
allocations is denoted by X.
The preferences of each individual i ∈ I over bundles in RG can be rep-
resented by a continuous utility function ui : RG+ → R. Individual i’s utility
of an allocation x depends only on the bundle xφi consumed by his family.
An economy is formally defined by (I, F,RG+, {ui}i∈I , e).
The preference represented by ui is:
• strictly monotonic if x > x′ implies ui(x) > ui(x′) for all x, x′ ∈ RG;
• locally non-satiated if for every x ∈ RG+ and  > 0, there exists some
x′ ∈ RG+ with d(x, x′) <  such that ui(x′) > ui(x);
• strictly convex if ui(x) ≥ ui(x′) together with x 6= x′ implies ui((1 −
α)x+ αx′) > ui(x′) for all x, x′ ∈ RG+ and α ∈ (0, 1);
• convex if ui(x) > ui(x′) implies ui((1 − α)x + αx′) > ui(x′) for all
x, x′ ∈ RG+ and α ∈ (0, 1).
Note that strict monotonicity implies local non-satiation and that strict
convexity implies convexity.
4For any two vectors x, x′ ∈ Rm for some integer m, say x ≥ x′ if xi ≥ x′i for all i,
x > x′ if x ≥ x′ but not x = x′ and x  x′ if xi > x′i for all i. The Euclidean distance
between x, x′ ∈ Rm is denoted d(x, x′).
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We derive family f ’s — typically incomplete — preferences %f from the
preferences of all its members. Family f weakly prefers bundle x to x′,
denoted x %f x′, if and only if ui(x) ≥ ui(x′) holds for all i ∈ f . If x %f x′
as well as x′ %f x hold then family f is indifferent between x and x′, denoted
x ∼f x′. Note that x ∼f x′ holds if and only if each member of f is indifferent
between x and x′. If x %f x′ holds but x ∼f x′ does not, then family f strictly
prefers x to x′, denoted x f x′. If ui(x) > ui(x′) and uj(x) < uj(x′) hold for
two family members i, j ∈ f then the family cannot rank x and x′, denoted
x ./f x
′.
All individuals — and therefore all families — only care about their own
consumption. So an individual prefers one allocation to a different allocation
if he prefers his family’s bundle in the first allocation to his family’s in the
second allocation. Similarly a family prefers a first allocation to a second
one if it prefers its bundle in the first allocation to its bundle in the second
allocation.
3.2 Fairness and Efficiency
An allocation x satisfies individual-no envy (is individual-NE) if no individual
envies any other individual, i.e., there are no two individuals i, i′ with
ui(xφi′) > ui(xφi).
An allocation x satisfies family-no envy (is family-NE) if no family envies
another family, i.e., there are no two families f, f ′ with:
xf ′ f xf .
An allocation x is individual-egalitarian-equivalent (individual-EE) if there
exists a bundle r (called the reference bundle) such that, for every individual
i ∈ I:
ui(xφi) = ui(r)
An allocation x is family-egalitarian-equivalent (family-EE) if there exists a
bundle r such that each family f who can rank xf and r is indifferent between
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the two bundles. I.e., for every family f :
xf ∼f r or xf ./f r.
An allocation x satisfies the individual fair-share guarantee (is individual-
FS) if no individual strictly prefers the fair share e (which contains a fraction
1
|F | of each good in the endowment) to his/her family’s bundle. So x is
individual-FS if for every i:
ui(xφi) ≥ ui (e) .
An allocation x satisfies the family fair-share guarantee (is family-FS) if no
family strictly prefers the fair share e to its bundle. i.e., there is no family f
with:
e f xf .
Any individual-NE allocation x is family-NE: if ui(xφi) ≥ ui(xφi′) holds
for each individual i then xf %f xf ′ holds for each family f . The converse
does not hold: in a family-NE allocation, some family f may be unable to
rank their own bundle xf and some other family’s bundle xf ′ , implying that
ui(xf ′) > ui(xf ) holds for some member i of family f , so that the alloca-
tion does not satisfy individual-NE. Similarly any individual-EE allocation
is family-EE and every individual-FS allocation is family-FS. The converse
does not hold in either case.
The set of all feasible individual-FS allocations is E := {x : ∑f∈F xf ≤
e and ui(xφi) ≥ ui(e) for all i ∈ I}. Since E contains the allocation in which
each family receives e it is non-empty. It is compact since it is bounded and
since each utility ui is continuous.
A triplet (p, x, x0) with x, x0 ∈ X and p ∈ RG is a market equilibrium
from endowment x0, if for each family and each bundle x′ (a) pxf ≤ px0f ,
and: (b) x′ f xf implies px′ > px0f . So (p, x, x0) is a market equilibrium
from endowment x0 if each bundle xf is affordable for that family and if
any bundle x′ a family strictly prefers to xf is unaffordable for that family.
If x0 = (e, . . . , e), then (p, x, x0) is called a market equilibrium from equal
endowments.
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An allocation x is Pareto dominated by a different allocation x′ if for every
individual i: ui(x
′
φi) ≥ ui(xφi), and for at least one individual j: uj(x′φj) >
uj(xφj). Equivalently, x is Pareto-dominated by x
′ if for every family f :
x′f %f xf , and for at least one family: x′f f xf . An allocation x is Pareto-
optimal in a set S if it is not Pareto-dominated by any allocation in the set
S. An allocation that is Pareto optimal in the set of all allocations X is
simply called Pareto-optimal.
A leximin optimal allocation (Dubins and Spanier, 1961; Moulin, 2004)
lexicographically maximizes the utilities from smallest to largest. A leximin
optimal allocation is always defined with respect to specific utility functions.
Formally, given some subset X ′ ⊆ X, define a subset X1 ⊆ X ′ as the set
of allocations x that maximize the smallest utility ui(x) over all i ∈ I and
x ∈ X ′. Supposing it exists, define X2 ⊆ X1 as the set of allocations x
that maximize the second smallest utility ui(x) over all i ∈ I and x ∈ X1.
Proceeding inductively, define X |I| ⊆ X |I|−1 as the set of allocations x that
maximize the | I |’th smallest utility (i.e., the largest utility) over all i ∈ I
and x ∈ X |I|−1. The set X |I| (if it exists) is called the set of {ui}i∈I-leximin
optimal allocations in X ′,
3.3 Examples with two goods
If there are only two goods in an economy, we call these two goods y and z.
Marginal rate of substitution. If a utility function ui : R2+ → R is
differentiable, we define the marginal rate of substitution between y and z,
MRSi(y, z), as:
MRSi(y, z) :=
d(ui(y, z))
dy
/
d(ui(y, z))
dz
.
Single-crossing property Two different strictly monotonic preferences
represented by ui and uj satisfy the single crossing property if any two
indifference-curves defined by ui(y, z) = α and uj(y, z) = β for some α, β ∈ R
have at most one point in common. So ui and uj have the single-crossing
property if for all bundles (y, z) and (y′, z′) and either ui = u, uj = u′ or
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ui = u
′, uj = u:
If y′ > y and z′ < z then u(y′, z′) ≥ u(y, z)⇒ u′(y′, z′) > u′(y, z)
If y′ < y and z′ > z then u′(y′, z′) ≥ u′(y, z)⇒ u(y′, z′) > u(y, z).
If one individuals’ marginal rate of substitution is higher than the other’s at
each possible bundle (y, z), then ui and uj satisfy the single crossing property.
An agent’s preference has a Cobb-Douglas utility representation if ui(y, z) =
yαiz1−αi holds for some αi ∈ (0, 1). Any such preferences are strictly mono-
tonic and strictly convex. Two different Cobb-Douglas utilities satisfy the
single crossing property.
Our proofs and examples use the following characterization of Pareto-
optimal allocations among families. This characterization is a well-known re-
sult from (behavioral) welfare economics, however, it is convenient to rephrase
it here in terms of family economies.
Theorem 3.1 Consider a two-good-economy (I, F,R2+, {ui}i∈I , e) with dif-
ferentiable utilities. Let x be an allocation in the interior of X. Then x is
Pareto optimal if and only if:⋂
f∈F
[min
i∈f
MRSi(yf , zf ),max
i∈f
MRSi(yf , zf )] 6= ∅
I.e., for each family f , we define its MRS range as the interval between the
smallest and the largest MRS of its members; the allocation is Pareto optimal
if the common intersection of all |F | MRS ranges is non-empty.
As a special case, two single-agent families f =: {s} and f ′ : = {s′}
whose utilities us and us′ satisfy the single-crossing property must consume
different bundles in any interior Pareto optimum.
This result has been shown to hold in (much) more general environments by
Fon and Otani (1979); Mandler (2014), so we omit its proof here. The state-
ment can also be proven with some simple modifications of the arguments in
Mas-Colell (1974).
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4 Fair Share Guarantee
In this short section, we show that individual-FS Pareto optima exist under
generic conditions.
Theorem 4.1 Any economy has an individual-FS Pareto optimum.
Proof Consider the set E of all feasible individual-FS allocations defined
above. Since E is compact, there exists an allocation x∗ that maximizes the
sum of all individuals utilities over all x ∈ X, so x∗ ∈ arg maxx∈E
∑
i∈I ui(xφi).
Since x∗ is not Pareto-dominated by any x′ ∈ E and since ui(x∗φi) ≥ ui(e)
holds for each i, x∗ is not Pareto dominated by any x′ /∈ E. So x∗ is Pareto
optimal. Since x∗ ∈ E it is individual-FS. 
Remark 4.2 An alternative proof of Theorem 4.1 relies on {ui}i∈I-leximin
optimal allocations. For this proof normalize all agents utilities such that
ui(e) = 0 for all i ∈ I. Since X is compact and since all ui are continu-
ous, each subset {X i}i∈I in the definition of {ui}i∈I-leximin optimal alloca-
tions is well-defined. So a {ui}i∈I-leximin optimal allocation x∗ exists. Since
(e, . . . , e) is feasible, ui(x
∗
φi) ≥ ui(e) holds for all i, so x∗ is FS. Since x∗ is
{ui}i∈I-leximin optimal, it is Pareto optimal.
5 No Envy
In this section, we prove that individual-NE Pareto optima exist under
generic conditions when there are only two families, but might not exist with
more than two families. Even if individual-NE Pareto optima exist, it might
be impossible to find them as market equilibria from equal endowments.
The different examples used to prove the impossibility results do not
rely on extreme conditions: each of these examples has only two goods and
three families, two of which are singletons. All individuals have plain vanilla
preferences — strictly convex and strictly monotonic.
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5.1 Individual-no envy with just two families
Theorem 5.1 Any economy with exactly two families and convex prefer-
ences has an individual-NE and individual-FS Pareto optimum.
Proof By Theorem 4.1, there exists an individual-FS Pareto optimum x.
To see that x is individual-NE, suppose some individual envies the other
family, so that ui(xφi) < ui(e − xφi) holds for some i. By convexity, ui(xφi)
must also be smaller than ui(
1
2
xφi+
1
2
(e−xφi)). But the latter bundle is exactly
the fair share e — a contradiction to the assumption that x is individual-FS.

5.2 Individual-no envy with more than two families
Theorem 5.1 does not extend to more than two families. In Proposition 5.2
we show that economies with three or more families need not have individual-
NE Pareto optima. To show this we construct an example with two goods
and three families, only one of which is made up of a husband and a wife. The
two others are singles. All preferences satisfy the single crossing property:
we assume that the two singles’ preferences are intermediate between the
husband’s the wife’s preferences. This assumption implies that the family
must consume the same bundle as each of the singles: otherwise, either the
husband or the wife would by the single crossing property envy one of the
two singles. A contradiction the arises since the two singles do not consume
the same bundle in any interior Pareto optimum (see Theorem 3.1). The
proof is illustrated in Figure 1.
Proposition 5.2 Some economies with three families have no individual-NE
Pareto optimum.
Proof Consider a two-good-economy with four agents I : = {h,w, s, s′}
belonging to three families F : =
{{h,w}, {s}, {s′}}. Each individual i ∈ I
has a strictly monotonic preference represented by a differentiable utility
ui : R2+ → R, and all preferences satisfy a single-crossing property so that
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Figure 1: An illustration of Proposition 5.2. There are four individuals
— wife, husband and two singles s and s′. Say (yf , zf ) is the bundle con-
sumed by the family consisting of the husband and wife. The single-crossing
property implies that the indifference curves of the husband, wife and the two
singles through (yf , zf ) only cross at that point. For s to not envy the family,
he must consume at or above his green indifference curve. If his consumption
is at the north-west of the family’s bundle, then the husband envies; if it is at
the south-east, then the wife envies; hence s must consume exactly (yf , zf ).
The same is true for s. But then the allocation cannot be Pareto-optimal,
since the two singles have different MRS-s at that bundle.
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for any two bundles (y, z), (y′, z′):5
If y′ > y and z′ < z then:
uh(y
′, z′) ≥ uh(y, z)⇒ us′(y′, z′) > us′(y, z),
us′(y
′, z′) ≥ us′(y, z)⇒ us(y′, z′) > us(y, z),
us(y
′, z′) ≥ us(y, z)⇒ uw(y′, z′) > uw(y, z).
If y′ < y and z′ > z then:
uw(y
′, z′) ≥ uw(y, z)⇒ us(y′, z′) > us(y, z),
us(y
′, z′) ≥ us(y, z)⇒ us′(y′, z′) > us′(y, z),
us′(y
′, z′) ≥ us′(y, z)⇒ uh(y′, z′) > uh(y, z).
Consider an individual-NE allocation x = ((yf , zf ), (ys, zs), (ys′ , zs′)). For
s not to envy f , we must have:
us(ys, zs) ≥ us(yf , zf )
Since all preferences are strictly monotonic, and since h and w may not envy
s, there are only three options regarding the relation of (yf , zf ) and (ys, zs):
• If ys > yf and zs < zf then us(ys, zs) ≥ us(yf , zf ) and single-crossing
imply that uw(ys, zs) > uw(yf , zf ) so the wife envies s.
• If ys < yf and zs > zf then us(ys, zs) ≥ us(yf , zf ) and single-crossing
imply that uh(ys, zs) > uh(yf , zf ) so the husband envies s.
So we must have (ys, zs) = (yf , zf ).
Applying the same arguments to s′ we see that also (ys′ , zs′) = (yf , zf )
holds, so (ys′ , zs′) = (ys, zs). But then, Theorem 3.1 implies that the alloca-
tion x cannot be Pareto-optimal. 
5For example, we can take agents with Cobb-Douglas preferences with different coeffi-
cients, such that the coefficients of the two singles s, s′ are between the coefficient of the
husband h and the coefficient of the wife w.
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5.3 Market equilibrium and individual-no envy
The classic proof of the existence of NE Pareto optima (Varian, 1974) uses
market equilibrium from equal endowments: consider an environment where
the existence of market equilibria is guaranteed. Equalize each individual’s
endowment, so that each individual is endowed with a fair share. Any market
equilibrium from this endowment satisfies the fair share guarantee and no
envy: first, note that the fair share is in each individual’s budget set. So
each agent must weakly prefer his equilibrium consumption to the fair share.
Since all agents have the same endowment, they all face the same budget
set. Since each individual maximizes his utility for this given budget set, no
individual envies any other.
This technique does not fare well in economies with families. Proposition
5.2 already shows that individual-NE Pareto optima need not exist. But even
if such individual-NE Pareto optima exist, they may not arise as a market
equilibrium from equal endowments.
Proposition 5.3 Some economies with families have individual-NE Pareto
optima, where no individual-NE Pareto optimum is a market equilibrium
from equal endowments.
Proof Consider a two-good-economy (I, F,RG+, {ui}i∈I , e) with four agents
I : = {h,w, s, s′} belonging to three families f : = {h,w}, {s} and {s′}.
There are 3 units of good y and of good z. The husband h and the single
person s have the same Cobb-Douglas preference with coefficient αh =
1
3
, the
wife w and the single person s′ have the same Cobb-Douglas preference with
coefficient αw =
2
3
.
For ((ys, zs), (ys′ , zs′), (yf , zf )) to be an allocation ys + ys′ + yf = 3 and
zs + zs′ + zf = 3 have to hold. For the singles and the family members
not to envy each other y
1
3
s z
2
3
s = y
1
3
f z
2
3
f and y
2
3
s′z
1
3
s′ = y
2
3
f z
1
3
f must hold. If
((ys, zs), (ys′ , zs′), (yf , zf )) is on the boundary of X then all members of at
least one family have zero utility. Since the members of this family may
not envy the other families, each agent must have utility zero in the al-
location ((ys, zs), (ys′ , zs′), (yf , zf )) which can therefore not be Pareto opti-
mal. So ((ys, zs), (ys′ , zs′), (yf , zf )) must be in the interior of X and
1
2
zs
ys
=
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MRSs(ys, zs) = MRSs′(zs′ , ys′) = 2
ys′
zs′
must hold by Theorem 3.1. The re-
sulting system of 5 equations in 6 unknowns has a continuum of solutions. To
obtain an example we additionally impose the symmetry condition yf = zf .
The resulting system has a unique solution, illustrated in Figure 2.6
Now, suppose that some individual-NE Pareto optimum ((ys, zs), (ys′ , zs′), (yf , zf ))
could be obtained as a market equilibrium from equal endowments. By
Theorem 3.1, (ys, zs) 6= (ys′ , zs′). Therefore, either (yf , zf ) 6= (ys, zs) or
(yf , zf ) 6= (ys′ , zs′) (or both). W.l.o.g. suppose that the former is true.
Since all individuals’ preferences are strictly convex, (ys, zs) is according to
us the unique optimal bundle in the budget set. Since (yf , zf ) 6= (ys, zs) and
since (yf , zf ) is in the budget set, it is according to us strictly worse than
(ys, zs). Since uh = us, the husband envies s - a contradiction. To obtain
an individual-NE Pareto optimum as a market equilibrium, the family must
have a higher income than the singles. 
Family size is not the relevant factor in the above proof, intra-family het-
erogeneity is: the same non-existence result holds if we replace each single
with a family of one hundred individuals with identical preferences. There-
fore, the disconnection between fairness and market equilibrium identified in
Proposition 5.3 can not be fixed by larger families higher budgets.
6This solution is such that
ys ≈ 0.654 zs ≈ 1.308
ys′ ≈ 1.308 zs′ ≈ 0.654
yf ≈ 1.0381 zf ≈ 1.0381
Since ((ys, zs), (ys′ , zs′), (yf , zf )) is a solution to the above system of equations, the singles
and the family members do not envy each other and there are no Pareto improvements
involving only the two singles. It is easy to check (numerically or graphically) that also
the singles do not envy each other, so the allocation is individual-NE. Moreover, the
singles’ marginal rate of substitution at (ys, zs) and respectively (ys′ , zs′) lies between the
husband’s and wife’s marginal rate of substitution at (yf , zf ). So by Theorem 3.1 the
allocation is Pareto optimal.
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Figure 2: An illustration of Proposition 5.3. The three blue discs denote
an allocation among the families. The husband and single s are indiffer-
ent between the family’s bundle and single s’s bundle as represented by the
bold indifference curve through these two bundles. The wife and single s′
are indifferent between the family’s bundle and single s′’s bundle as repre-
sented by the dashed indifference curve through these two bundles. Since
each individual consumes on an indifference curve that is at or above the
indifference curves of the two other bundles, the allocation is individual-NE.
The allocation is Pareto optimal, since the MRS of s and s′ at their bun-
dles, represented by the thick dotted line lies between the husband’s and the
wife’s MRSs at their family’s bundle (represented by the thin dotted lines).
To support this allocation as a market equilibrium, both singles have to face
the budget set with the thick dotted line as its frontier. The family’s bundle
is not affordable with this budget.
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5.4 Market-equilibrium and the individual fair share
guarantee
While we have shown in Theorem 4.1 that any economy has an individual-FS
Pareto optimum, the following proposition shows that market equilibria need
not be individual-FS.
Proposition 5.4 Some economies have market equilibria from equal endow-
ments that are not individual-FS.
Proof Consider a two-good-economy (I, F,R2+, {ui}i∈I , e) with four agents
I : = {h,w, h′, w′} belonging to two families f : = {h,w} and f ′ = {h′, w′}.
Each individual i ∈ I has a Cobb-Douglas utility with coefficients αh = .9,
αw = .6, αw′ = .4, and αh′ = .1. Then
(
1, ((.9, .1), (.1, .9)), (e, e)
)
is a market
equilibrium from equal endowments: At the price p = 1, each husband gets
his best affordable bundle. However both wives prefer e = (.5, .5) to their
respective bundles: .9.6.1.4 < .5.6.5.4 = .5. 
5.5 Family-no envy Pareto optima that satisfy the in-
dividual fair share guarantee
We next show that family-NE individual-FS Pareto optima exist under gen-
eral conditions. In the upcoming proof of Theorem 5.5 we use a modified
equilibrium approach in which the families’ choice sets are restricted to bun-
dles that each member prefers to the fair share.
Theorem 5.5 Any economy with locally non-satiated, strictly convex pref-
erences has a family-NE and individual-FS Pareto optimum.
Proof We use Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975)’s result on the existence
of equilibrium in abstract economies. To this end, we define an abstract
economy Γ: = (Xf ,Af , Pf )n+1f=1, where each agent {1, . . . , n} is a family and
agent n + 1 is a special agent called the “market maker”. The elements of
the abstract economy are defined as follows:
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• Choice sets : for each family f ∈ F , the choice set is Xf : = {xf ∈
RG+ | xf ≤ e and ui(xf ) ≥ ui(e) for all i ∈ f}. So each family only
considers feasible bundles that are weakly-preferred by all members to
the fair share e. For the market-maker, Xn+1 = ∆ is the simplex of all
price-vectors, normalized so that their sum equals 1.
• Action correspondences : Af : X1 × · · · ×Xn+1 → Xf . For each family
f ∈ F and each (x1, . . . , xn, p) ∈ X1×· · ·Xn+1 defineAf (x1, . . . , xn, p) =
A(x, p) : = {x′f ∈ Xf | p · x′f ≤ p · e} as the set of bundles x′f that, at
price p, cost no more than the fair share e. For the market maker n+ 1
and each (x1, . . . , xn, p) ∈ X1 × · · ·Xn+1 define An+1(x1, . . . , xn, p) =
An+1(x, p) : = ∆, the full simplex.
• Preference correspondences : Pf : X1×· · ·Xn+1 → Xf . For each family
f ∈ F and each (x1, . . . , xn, p) ∈ X1×· · ·Xn+1 define Pf (x1, . . . , xn, p) =
Pf (x, p) : = {x′f ∈ Xf | ui(x′f ) > ui(xf ) for all i ∈ f} as the set of
all bundles x′f strictly preferred to xf by all members of f . For the
market-maker n + 1 and each (x1, . . . , xn, p) ∈ X1 × · · ·Xn+1 define
Pn+1(x1, . . . , xn, p) = Pn+1(x, p) : = {p′ ∈ ∆ | p′(
∑n
f=1 xf − e) >
p(
∑n
f=1 xf − e)}.
We next show that the abstract economy Γ satisfies conditions a) b’), b”),
c’) and c”) of Shafer and Sonnenschein’s Theorem.
a) For each family f ∈ F the choice-set Xf is non-empty since it contains
e, convex since all agents’ preferences are strictly convex, and compact
since it is bounded by e and closed by the continuity of all utilities ui.
Since Xn+1 = ∆ is non-empty, convex and compact, the conditions also
apply for the the market maker f = n+ 1.
b’) Af is continuous since it is for f ∈ F a standard budget correspondence
and for f = n+ 1 a constant.
b”) For f ∈ F , Af is non-empty since e ∈ Af (x, p); as a standard budget
correspondence it is also convex. For f = n + 1 the conditions are
obvious.
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c’) To see that Pf has for each f ∈ F an open graph, fix any ((x, p), x′f ) in
the graph of Pf , so that ui(x
′
f ) > ui(xf ) holds for all i ∈ f . Since ui is
for each i ∈ f continuous, there exists a small  > 0 such that ui(y′f ) >
ui(yf ) holds for all (y
′
f , yf ) with d(y
′
f , x
′
f ) <  and d(yf , xf ) < . So
Pf has an open graph. Since Pn+1 can be represented by a continuous
utility function, Pn+1 also has an open graph.
c”) For each x ∈ X, xf is not an element of the convex hull of Pf (x, p). To
see that this holds fix an arbitrary (x, p) ∈ X1×· · ·Xn+1 and note that
the preferred-bundle set Pf (x, p) is for each f ∈ F and for the market
maker convex, so that Pf (x, p) equals its convex hull. Since Pf (x, p)
contains only bundles strictly better than xf it does not contain xf .
By Shafer and Sonnenschein’s theorem this abstract economy has an equi-
librium, which is a vector (x1, . . . , xn, p) = (x, p) ∈ X1 × · · · ×Xn ×∆ with
for all f ∈ {1, · · · , n+ 1} :
1. xf ∈ Af (x, p), and:
2. Pf (x, p) ∩ Af (x, p) = ∅.
We now show that the allocation x is feasible, Pareto optimal, individual-FS
and family-NE.
• x is feasible. Proof: Fix any f ∈ F . By (1) we have p · xf ≤ p · e.
Since all agents i ∈ f have locally non-satiated preferences, (2) implies
p ·xf = p ·e. Summing over all families we obtain p · (
∑n
f=1 xf −e) = 0.
By (2) again, An+1(x, p)∩Pn+1(x, p) equals ∅, so that p·(
∑n
f=1 xf−e) ≤
p · (∑nf=1 xf − e) = 0 holds for all p ∈ ∆. This can only hold if∑n
f=1 xf − e = 0. Hence x is feasible as claimed.
• x is individual-FS. Proof: For every f ∈ F , by (1), every bundle xf
is in Xf . By the definition of the choice sets Xf , every such bundle is
weakly-better than e for each agent in f .
• x is family-NE. The proof uses the following observation. Fix any
f ∈ F . There does not exist any bundle yf ∈ Af (x, p) \ {xf} with
yf %f xf . Proof: Suppose such a bundle yf did exist. Since Af (x, p)
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is convex, 1
2
xf +
1
2
yf is also an element of Af (x, p). Since each agent
i ∈ f has strictly convex preferences, and since each agent i ∈ f weakly
prefers yf to the (different) bundle xf , each agent i ∈ f strictly prefers
1
2
xf +
1
2
yf to xf . But then we have
1
2
xf +
1
2
yf ∈ Pf (x, p) a contradiction
to (2).
Now, the affordability constraints (represented by the action setsAf (x, p))
are the same for all families f ∈ F , so xf ′ ∈ Af (x, p) holds for any pair
f, f ′ ∈ F . By the preceding observation we have have that xf ′ %f xf
can only hold if xf = xf ′ . Therefore, x in family-NE.
• x is Pareto optimal. Proof: Suppose by contradiction that x was Pareto
dominated by some y with
∑n
f=1 yf ≤ e. Since y Pareto-dominates x
and since xf ∈ Xf for each family, we have for each agent i ∈ f
ui(yf ) ≥ ui(xf ) ≥ ui(e). Since
∑n
f=1 yf ≤ e implies yf ≤ e we in sum
have yf ∈ Xf for each family f ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
Since y 6= x, yf∗ 6= xf∗ must hold for some family f ∗ ∈ {1, · · · , n}.
Since yf∗ %f∗ xf∗ , the above observation implies that yf∗ /∈ Af∗(x, p)
and therefore yf∗p > xp. Summing over all families we obtain
∑n
f=1 p ·
yf >
∑n
f=1 p · xf = p · e. A contradiction arises since the feasibility of
y implies
∑n
f=1 p · yf = p · e. So x is Pareto optimal.

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6 Egalitarian Equivalence
6.1 Pareto-optimality contradicts individual-egalitarian
equivalence
In the preceding section we showed that it does not take much for individual-
NE and Pareto optimality to clash. Individual-EE is even more restrictive:
even economies with two families need not have any individual-EE Pareto
optima. To understand this difference between egalitarian equivalence in the
standard model and individual-EE, fix an arbitrary bundle r and a family
consisting of a husband and wife with differing preferences. While there
generally are many bundles x such that a single agent is indifferent between
x and r, it is much harder to find bundles x such that both the husband
and the wife are indifferent between x and r. Indeed, if the husband’s and
the wife’s preferences have the single crossing property then x = r is the
only bundle such that the husband and the wife are indifferent between x
and r. In the upcoming non-existence proof we specify an economy with
two such couples which must consume the same bundle in any individual-EE
allocation. We obtain a contradiction by differentiating the preferences of
the two couples enough, so that they must consume different bundles in any
interior Pareto optimum.
Proposition 6.1 Some economies with two families have no individual-EE
Pareto optimum.
Proof Consider a two-good-economy with with four individuals I : =
{h,w, h′, w′} belonging to two families f = {h,w} and f ′ = {h′, w′}. All
four individuals have strictly monotone and strictly convex preferences, sat-
isfying the single-crossing property such that for each bundle (y, z):
MRSw(y, z) < MRSh(y, z) < MRSh′(y, z) < MRSw′(y, z)
Assume that x is an individual-EE Pareto optimum and let r be its refer-
ence bundle. By the single crossing property there is exactly one bundle
(yf , zf ) such that h and w are indifferent between that bundle and r, namely
(yf , zf ) = r. By the same token, f
′ must consume r too, so that x = (r, r).
24
Since maxi∈f MRSi(r) < mini∈f ′MRSi(r) the allocation is by Theorem 3.1
not Pareto optimal. The proof is illustrated in Figure 3. 
6.2 Family-egalitarian equivalent Pareto optima with
the individual-fair share guarantee
While individual-EE Pareto optima exist only rarely, family-EE Pareto op-
tima that are also individual-FS exist under quite general conditions:
Theorem 6.2 If all individuals’ preferences are strictly monotonic and strictly
convex, then some Pareto optimum is family-EE and individual-FS.
If the equal split (e, . . . , e) is Pareto-optimal in some economy, then
(e, . . . , e) is a family-EE and individual-FS Pareto optimum. Our proof of
Theorem 6.2 therefore focusses on the case where (e, . . . , e) is not Pareto
optimal. We start by showing that any economy with strictly monotonic
and strictly convex where (e, . . . , e) is not Pareto optimal has an individual-
strict-FS allocation x in the sense that each individual i strictly prefers xφi
to the equal split (ui(xφi) > ui(e) for all i ∈ I).
Given that Theorem 6.2 assumes monotonic preferences, we can normalize
utilities so that ui(t·e) : = t− 1|F | for each i and t ∈ R, implying that ui(e) = 0
holds for each i. We use leximin-optimal allocations relative to this specific
choice of utility functions.
Lemma 6.3 In any economy with strictly monotonic preferences, all fami-
lies have the same minimum utility in each {ui}i∈I-leximin-optimal allocation
Proof Suppose by contradiction that some families have different minimum
utility, say mini∈f ui(x∗φi) > mini∈I ui(x
∗
φi) holds for some f . Starting with x
∗,
create a new allocation x′ by redistributing a small amount of goods from f
to all other families such that still mini∈f ui(x′φi) > mini∈I ui(x
∗
φi). By strict
monotonicity, ui(x
′
φi) > ui(x
∗
φi) holds for all i /∈ f . But this means that the
new allocation x′ is {ui}i∈I-leximin-better than x∗ — a contradiction. 
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Figure 3: An illustration of Proposition 6.1. Family 1 has two members
with solid indifference curves; Family 2 has two members with dotted indif-
ference curves. To be indifferent between their bundle to some r, they must
consume exactly r. But this allocation cannot be Pareto optimal — a Pareto
improvement can be attained by giving the solid family r+ (,−) and giving
the dotted family r + (−, ), for some small . The same considerations are
true for any r.
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Lemma 6.4 In any economy with strictly monotonic and strictly convex
preferences, either the equal allocation (e, . . . , e) is Pareto optimal, or there
is an individual-strict-FS Pareto-optimum.
Proof If (e, . . . , e) is {ui}i∈I-leximin optimal then it is Pareto-optimal so we
are done. If not, Remark 4.2 implies the existence of a {ui}i∈I-leximin opti-
mal allocation x∗ 6= (e, . . . , e) in X. It is individual-FS,, i.e., mini∈I ui(x∗φi) ≥
0; we show that it is also individual-strict-FS, i.e., mini∈I ui(x∗φi) > 0.
Suppose by contradiction that mini∈I ui(x∗φi) = 0. By the Lemma 6.3, all
families have the same minimal utility in x∗, so each family f has a member
i ∈ f with ui(x∗f ) = 0. Define x∗∗ : = 12x∗ + 12(e, . . . , e). By assumption,
x∗ is not the equal allocation, so there are some families f with x∗f 6= e. By
strict convexity, all members of such families must now have ui(x
∗∗
f ) > 0.
Moreover, the members of families with x∗f = e are indifferent between x
∗
and x∗∗. Therefore, x∗∗ is {ui}i∈I-leximin-better than x∗, contradicting the
{ui}i∈I-leximin-optimality of x∗. 
Proof of Theorem 6.2 If (e, . . . , e) is is Pareto-optimal, we are done as
this allocation is individual-FS and family-EE. So suppose (e, . . . , e) is not
Pareto optimal.
We consider only allocations in the set E — the set of individual-FS
allocations. In this set, the utilities of all agents are at least 0. For each
family f , define an aggregate utility function Uf : RG → R, by:
Uf (xf ) : =
∏
i∈f
ui(xf ).
Since each Uf is continuous and since E is compact, there exists a {Uf}f∈F -
leximin optimal allocation in E, say x∗. Note that, for all x ∈ E, Uf (xf ) ≥ 0,
and Uf (xf ) = 0 if and only if ui(xf ) = 0 for some i ∈ f . So Uf (x∗f ) ≥ 0
must hold for all f ∈ F . By Lemma 6.4 there exists an individual-strict-FS
allocation x′, in which Uf (x′f ) > 0 for all f ∈ F . Since x∗ is {Uf}f∈F -
leximin optimal, minf∈F Uf (x∗f ) ≥ minf∈F Uf (x′f ) > 0. We claim that x∗ is
individual-FS, family-EE and Pareto optimal.
Since x∗ ∈ E by definition, it is individual-FS.
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To see that x∗ is Pareto optimal, suppose that some x′ did Pareto domi-
nate it. Since x′ ∈ E and since ui(x′φi) ≥ ui(x∗φi) > 0 holds for all i, with first
inequality holding strictly for at least some i′, we have Uf ′(x′f ′) > Uf ′(x
∗
f ′)
for the family f ′ containing i′ and Uf (x′f ) ≥ Uf (x∗f ) for all f . So x′ ∈ E is
{Uf}f∈F -leximin-better than x∗ — a contradiction to the definition of x∗.
To see that x∗ is family-EE, we first show that Uf (x∗f ) = Uf ′(x
∗
f ′) holds
for all f, f ′. Suppose not. So some family f ′ is such that Uf ′(x∗f ′) >
minf 6=f ′ Uf (x∗f ). Since ui(x
∗
f ) > ui(e) holds for each i ∈ f we can redistribute
a small amount of goods from family f ′ to all other families to obtain x∗∗ ∈ E.
Since each agent’s preferences are strictly monotonic, Uf (x
∗∗
f ) > Uf (x
∗
f ) holds
for all f 6= f ′ — a contradiction to x∗ being {Uf}f∈F -leximin optimal.
Now let V ∈ R be that equal aggregate utility, V := Uf (x∗f ) for all f ∈ F .
Define t ∈ R and a bundle r ∈ X by:
t := V
1
|F | +
1
| F | and r := t · e.
By normalization of all utilities ui we have, for all i ∈ I, ui(r) = ui(t · e) =
t − 1|F | = V
1
|F | . For each family, there are two cases. If ui(x
∗
f ) = V
1
|F | for
all i ∈ f , then each agent i ∈ f is indifferent between x∗f and t · e, so that
x∗f ∼f t · e. If not, then Uf (x∗f ) = V implies that some agent i ∈ f strictly
prefers x∗f to t · e while another agent j ∈ f strictly prefers t · e to x∗f . In this
latter case we have x∗f ./f t · e. So x∗ is family-EE with reference bundle t · e.

Theorem 6.2 is true even without strict convexity, as long as one of the
following holds: (a) the equal allocation is Pareto optimal, or (b) there exists
an individual-strict-FS allocation. We require strict convexity only in the
proof of Lemma 6.4 to ensure that one of these conditions holds. We show
next that convexity alone is not sufficient for the conclusion of the Theorem.
Proposition 6.5 (a) Some economies with strictly monotonic and convex
preferences with only three families have no individual-FS and family-EE
Pareto optimum. (b) There always exist family-EE Pareto optima, individual-
FS Pareto optima, and family-EE individual-FS allocations.
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Figure 4: Non-existence of Pareto-optimal FS family-EE allocations.
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Proof (a) Consider a two good economy with 3/2 units of y, 3/2 units of
z. There are five agents I : = {h,w, h′, w′, s} belonging to three families
f : = {h,w}, f ′ : = {h′, w′} and {s}, where:
• The single s and the husbands h and h′ have identical linear preferences:
uh(y, z) = uh′(y, z) = us(y, z) = y + z.
• The wives w and w′ have different Cobb-Douglas preferences: uw(y, z) =
y1/4z3/4 and uw′(y, z) = y
3/4z1/4.
For the single and both husbands to enjoy the fair-share guarantee, yf +zf =
yf ′ + zf ′ = ys + zs = 1 must hold. The only Pareto-optimal allocation
satisfying these equations gives family f (1/4, 3/4) and family f ′ (3/4, 1/4);
see Figure 4.
But this allocation is not family-EE. Suppose by contradiction that it is,
and let r := (yr, zr) be the corresponding reference bundle. Since the single
must be indifferent between his bundle and r, yr + zr must equal 1. This
means that both husbands are indifferent between their family’s bundle and
r. But, regardless of which r we pick, at least one wife will prefer her family’s
bundle to r.
(b) To see that there always exists a family-EE Pareto optimum, define
aggregate family utilities Uf : RG → R so that Uf (xf ) : =
∑
i∈f ui(xf )
for each f ∈ F . Define x∗ as a {Uf}f∈F -leximin optimal allocation in X.
To see that Uf (x
∗
f ) = Uf ′(x
∗
f ′) holds for all families f, f
′, suppose that
Uf ′(x
∗
f ′) > Uf ′′(x
∗
f ′′) held for two families f
′, f ′′. Define a new allocation
x′ by redistributing a small amount of goods from family f ′ to all other fami-
lies. By monotonicity, minf∈F Uf (x∗f ) < minf∈F Uf (x
′
f ) a contradiction to the
{Uf}f∈F -leximin optimality of x∗ in X. Since Uf (x∗f ) = Uf ′(x∗f ′) holds for all
families f, f ′, x∗ is by the arguments in the proof of Theorem 6.2 family-EE.
As a {Uf}f∈F -leximin optimal allocation in X, x∗ is Pareto optimal.
Any {ui}i∈I-leximin-optimal allocation in X is individual-FS and Pareto
optimal. Finally (e, . . . , e) is individually-FS and family-EE. 
To sum, without strict convexity, we can guarantee any two properties out
of {Pareto optimality, individual-FS, family-EE} but not all three.
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7 Alternatives
7.1 Individual-fairness vs. family-fairness
There are always two options to adapt a preference-based property for indi-
viduals to our environment with families: a strict adaptation requires that
the property holds for each individual, a weak one requires that the prop-
erty holds for the families’ incomplete preferences. We indeed studied the
stricter notions of individual-FS, NE, and EE as well as the weaker notions
of family-FS, NE, and EE.
There are two further concepts for which we only gave one adaptation:
market equilibria and Pareto optima. In each case we use the — standard
— family based adaptation. The alternative more restrictive adaptations
pose severe existence problems. To see this say, a triplet (p, x, x0) with
x, x0 ∈ X and p ∈ RG is an “individual”-market equilibrium from endowment
x0, if for each individual and each bundle x′: (a) pxf ≤ px0f , and: (b)
ui(x
′) > ui(xφi) implies px′ > px0φi. So (p, x, x
0) is an “individual”-market
equilibrium from endowment x0 if each bundle xf is affordable for that family
and if any bundle x′ an individual strictly prefers to xf is unaffordable for that
individual’s family. So for (p, x, x0) to be a “individual”-market equilibrium
all individuals within the same family must agree on their optimal bundle
for a given budget set. Even in the simple case where families have members
with different Cobb-Douglas utilities, this case will never arise.
Similarly, “individual”-Pareto optimal allocations, in the sense that any
alternative allocation x′ which is not indifferent for each agent must be
strictly worse for some agent, rarely exist. Even an economy with two fam-
ilies where there two wives have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences which
differ from the two husbands identical Cobb-Douglas preferences there are
no such “individual”-Pareto optima.
Comparing the “individual”-adaptations of the different principles we
see that the individual-EE falls into the same class as the “individual”-
adaptations of market equilibria and Pareto optima: allocations that are
individual-EE only exist under the rarest circumstances. No envy and the
fair share guarantee present a different picture. Our results show that the
individual-FS can easily be attained, even in combination with additional
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fairness properties such as family-NE or family-EE.
Individual-NE falls right in the middle between individual-EE and individual-
FS. While individual-NE can easily be attained when there are only two
families, the prospects for individual-NE with more than two families are
bleak. There is, however, another well-defined sense in which individual-NE
is easier to attain than the strict adaptations of Pareto optimality, market
equilibrium and egalitarian equivalence:
Consider a sequence of two-good-economies with | F |> 2 families, each
of which consisting of one husband and one wife. Say all agents have Cobb-
Douglas preferences. Consider any fixed family: while the husband and wife
in that family have different coefficients in each economy their coefficients
converge to the same limit. All families coefficients converge to different lim-
its. While no economy in this sequence has an “individual”-Pareto optimum
or an “individual”-market equilibrium, there is some number n ∈ N such
that each economy in the sequence after n has individual-NE Pareto optima.
7.2 Both family-no envy and family-egalitarian equiv-
alence
When do Pareto optima exist that are both family-NE and family-EE? Thom-
son (1990) showed that, with three or more individual agents, Pareto optima
with an egalitarian equivalence typically do not satisfy no envy. Since the
case of single agents is a special case of our model with families, there is little
hope to find Pareto optima that are both family-NE and family-EE.
7.3 Grouping by preferences
Some of our negative examples depend on quite divergent preferences within
families. For instance, the economy without individual-NE Pareto optima
(Proposition 5.2) relies on the fact that the husband is more similar to one
of the singles than to his wife, who in turn is more similar to the other sin-
gle than to her husband. This particular economy has individual-NE Pareto
optima for a different family structure where people with more similar prefer-
ences form families. So one may wonder whether economies with assortatively
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matched families always have individual-NE Pareto optima.
To see that this is not the case consider a two-good-economy with three
women and three men, who have to form three (heterosexual) couples. Say
that all individuals have Cobb-Douglas preferences, where mi and wi respec-
tively denote the coefficient rates of man and woman i. Say these coefficients
are ordered such that m1 < m2 < w1 < m3 < w2 < w3. Consider the assor-
tative matching where man mi and woman wi get married, so fi = {mi, wi}
for all i = 1, 2, 3. By Theorem 3.1 f1 and f3 must consume different bundles.
Since w1 can’t envy f2 and since w2 and m2 cannot envy f1 families f1 and
f2 must consume the same bundle. Mutatis mutandis we see that also f2 and
f3 must consume the same bundle, but then by Theorem 3.1 this allocation
is not Pareto optimal.
If we allow any arbitrary grouping into pairs in the above problem an
individual-NE Pareto optimum exists: simply match the two agents with the
highest two coefficients, with the middle coefficients and the lowest coeffi-
cients. Then find a market equilibrium from equal endowments given that
each pair maximizes its average utility. The question whether (and how) this
observation generalizes is open.
7.4 Democratic fairness
Individual-NE is a very strong requirement that often fails to exist. In con-
trast, family-NE is a quite weak requirement that allows allocations where in
each family, all agents except one are envious. A possible middle ground be-
tween these extremes is democratic-NE. An allocation is h-democratic-NE,
for some fraction h ∈ [0, 1], if in each family, at least a fraction h of the
members perceive the allocation as fair. This criterion may be of practical
application if the families represent democratic countries. For example, if
an allocation is 1/2-democratic-NE, then there is a hope that this allocation
will be approved in a referendum.
In general, democratic-NE Pareto-optima are not guaranteed to exist. An
example similar to the one in Proposition 5.2 shows that, for every integer
k ≥ 2, there are economies with 2k− 1 families in which no Pareto-optimum
is NE for more than 1/k of each family’s members. In particular, with 5
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or more families there might be no Pareto-optimum that is more than 1/3-
democratic NE. This leaves open the following practical question: with 3 or 4
families, is there always a Pareto-optimum that is NE for 1/2 of the members
in each family?
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